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BOOK REVIEWS
Enterprise Law of the 80's
Reviewed by Donald W. Hoagland*
RowE, F.M., JAcOBS, F.G., JOELSON, M.R. (eds.); EN'rssu'l LAw OF THE 80's:
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CoMPfrrnoN AND INDUSTRIAL OR-
GANIZATION; ABA Press (1980); ISBN 0-89707-018-6, LC 80-67958; xviii, 254
pp.; footnotes, index.
I. INTRODUCTION
This volume is a report of a symposium held in Luxembourg, Brus-
sels and London from September 25-28, 1979. The sessions of the sympo-
sium were organized primarily by the editors and were attended by many
of the preeminent experts in antitrust law of the Atlantic community.
Their papers and comments represent more a set of sophisticated specu-
lations on the evolution of competition law and organization concepts
than a survey or analysis of the state of the law on either of those two
subjects. As such, and as an opportunity to read the expert speculations
of a group of witty and highly competent participants, this volume offers
rich material for people who are concerned with the evolution of competi-
tion and industrial organization law.
As a gathering of representatives from many different nations, the
symposium offered an opportunity for discussions of comparative compe-
tition law. Comparative observations or comments will not determine
cases within any jurisdiction, but, particularly in the field of competition
law, they are valuable because of the history of the development of legal
institutions in this field on both sides of the Atlantic."
* Donald W. Hoagland is a partner at Davis, Graham & Stubbs in Denver, Colorado.
B.A., Yale University; L.L.B., Columbia University Law School. Mr. Hoagland served as
Assistant Administrator for Development Finance and Private Enterprise in the U.S.
Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant to
AID and to the Government of Indonesia. Mr. Hoagland is the author of "Investment in
Indonesia Today," published by the Government of Indonesia, as well as the Introduction
for The Law of Transnational Business Transactions.
1. The field of competition law presents the unique example of a legal institution im-
ported into Europe from the United States. For better or for worse, the antitrust concepts
evolving in Europe today have their intellectual roots in the American antitrust law of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rowe, Preface to ENTrERPRISE LAW OF THE
80's: EUROPEAN AND AMEmCAN PERSPECTIES ON COMMrION AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
ix (F.M. Rowe, F.G. Jacobs & M.R. Joelson eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Rowe].
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All of the scheduled speakers presented papers or extended remarks.2
An additional group of knowledgeable participants gathered to offer com-
ments, challenges, and supplemental discussion.3 It is important to note
the number and range of participants in this symposium in order to un-
derstand the distillation of experience embodied in both the papers
presented and the comments and discussion based on those papers.
A fine and stimulating range of issues was raised and considered. It
was not the group's purpose to arrive at operational solutions to pressing
problems, although suggestions for change were made, welcomed, and ex-
tensively considered. The participants, the acknowledged leaders of their
profession, were having a conversation which represented the informed,
sophisticated, sometimes humorous, sometimes world-weary, and regu-
larly wry and witty observations of a skilled group of practitioners.
II. WHO WILL DECIDE?
It is clear that antitrust law is a fundamental element of the eco-
nomic and political structures of the United States and the European Ec-
onomic Community (EEC). The most penetrating observations of this
symposium came from, and were stimulated by, the summaries of Freder-
ick Rowe' and the questions asked by Jeremy F. Lever. 5 The issue which
Rowe and Lever identified, and which this reviewer takes to be the most
fundamental question in the field, is the political question of who should
decide the structure of the commercial world we live in. When a subject
becomes sufficiently funda mental and is covered by a set of regulations,
the jurisdiction of which has been given to certain administrative or judi-
cial institutions of government, a question which must be asked from
time to time is whether authority has been lodged with the proper organs
of government. This is a question which does not arise exclusively in the
context of antitrust law but is one which must be answered satisfactorily
before any body of law or of regulations will be accepted by the society
burdened by them.
In the United States, antitrust authority was first delegated to the
2. These speakers were: Professor Michel Waelbroeck, Earl E. Pollock, John Temple
Lang, Professor Barry E. Hawk, Professor James A. Rahl, Willy Schlieder, Donald L. Hol-
ley, Ivo E. Schwartz, Kingman W. Brewster, Lord Richard Wilberforce, Professor Gordon
Bornte, Frederick M. Rowe, Allen C. Holmes, Professor Francis G. Jacobs, and Mark R.
Joelson.
3. This group included: Professor Arved Deringer, Professor Ren6 Joliet, Aurelio Pap-
palardo, Frits Salomonson, Jeremy F. Lever, Professor E.J. Mestmficker, Carl H. Amon, Dr.
Betty Bock, Ira M. Millstein, Valentine Korah, J.D. Keir, A.H. Hermann, Professor Basil
Yamey, Sir Alan Neale, J.P. Warner, Harvey M. Applebaum, John H. Morrison, and Doug-
las E. Rosenthal.
4. Rowe, supra note 1, at xi-xii; ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80's: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPEITION AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 177, 200 (F.M. Rowe, F.G. Ja-
cobs & M.R. Joelson eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ENTERPRISE LAW].
5. ENTERPRISE LAW, supra note 4, at 97, 190.
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courts." Later the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was also given au-
thority over antitrust problems in an effort to launch an administrative
agency with the capacity to anticipate and prohibit damaging anticompe-
titive conduct.7 Neither of these delegations has been particularly suc-
cessful. The FTC has become involved in so many dubious enterprises
that there have been times when it has come close to being abolished.8
The courts have become ensnared in elaborate discovery proceedings to
the point that the judicial system could break down from the sheer
weight of big antitrust cases.0 One British practitioner pointed out that
the United States was making its predicament unnecessarily worse by
such "errors" as allowing treble damages in antitrust cases, by permitting
contingent fees, and by not charging the losing party with some of the
winner's costs.10
III. THE BIG CASE
To place the problem of the "big" U.S. antitrust case somewhat in
context, a few specific facts may be useful. For example, in one set of
cases involving an alleged price-fixing cartel in the uranium industry,"1
one defendant, among many in the proceeding, has had to produce eight
million documents. This defendant has employed eighty-five lawyers and
107 paralegals in three different cities, and the lawyers and paralegals
have been working on these cases for about four years. Depositions were
taken of over 200 individuals, each deposition taking anywhere from one-
half day to forty-five days. Disputes about the discovery proceedings have
been appealed to the highest state courts ten times. A trial on the merits
has not yet, and may never be concluded.
When a U.S. defendant in one of these cases failed to produce certain
documents because of a blocking statute' in Canada, the state court at-
tempted to force production of the documents and eventually issued a
final judgment on the merits against the American company for failure to
produce the documents which the law of Canada made it criminal to pro-
duce. The "big case" game has become so expansive that even a public
offering of shares in an antitrust claim was offered to the investing
public."
6. Id. at 219.
7. Id. at 217.
8. Id. at 224-27; Debate, The Federal Trade Commission Under Attack: Should the
Commission's Role be Changed?, 49 ANTrmuST L.J. 1481 (1980).
9. ENTERPMIE LAw, supra note 4, at 227-28.
10. Id. at 233.
11. United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). For a complete description of the proceedings, see the report
of the case at 629 P.2d 231.
12. A blocking statute makes it a crime for persons to hand over business records sub-
poenaed in foreign antitrust proceedings and, thus, prevents discovery. See [July-Dec.] AN-
TrrRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 993, at A-7 (Dec. 11, 1980).
13. ENTrPiusE LAW, supra note 4, at 185 n.37.
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The scope of this problem broadens when we consider the extent of
governmental participation in business in many countries of the world.
The American antitrust laws were adopted in the framework of an econ-
omy whose dominant participants were privately owned and operated en-
terprises. Now many participants in the international markets are en-
tirely or predominantly owned or operated by a government. For these
government-owned enterprises, profit is only one of their complex of in-
terrelated objectives, and applying antitrust laws becomes inappropriate.
It is not possible to bring an offending nation into court as a defendant in
a private antitrust action, although the American courts have opened the
door to actions by foreign governments against U.S. companies for dam-
ages under our antitrust laws. 4 The panelists in this publication have
pointed out this anomaly in the availability of the antitrust laws, and it
remains one of the major areas for future development. 5
IV. SHIFTING U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY
These papers were delivered in 1979. The Carter Administration was
still in office, and that Administration's policies were more or less compa-
rable to the official U.S. antitrust policies pursued by Democratic admin-
istrations since 1946.1" The relatively aggressive pursuit of trade regula-
tion enforcement mechanisms which characterized the Carter
Administration is not the policy of the Reagan Administration. The anti-
trust philosophy expressed by the present Attorney General, William
French Smith, represents a substantial reduction in reach and range for
the federal antitrust laws.' 7 The International Business Machines case
has been dismissed.'8 The American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)
case has been settled.1" Mobil apparently thought it had a reasonable
chance of being permitted to acquire Marathon.2" We may well find that
the next symposium of this character will not be so much concerned with
the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. antitrust laws as it is with a debate
about simplification and dilution of the antitrust laws and the impact
upon the economy of the accelerating concentration of economic power
through mergers and acquisitions.
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
Lawyers are trained primarily to search for facts to establish the ele-
14. Id. at 241; Comment, The Status of Foreign Sovereigns in Private Antitrust Ac-
tions, 11 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 81 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
15. ENTERPRISE LAW, supra note 4, at 224.
16. Id. at 221, 224-26.
17. See Interview with William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 151 (1981).
18. [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1047, at 88 (Jan. 14, 1982).
19. Id. at 82.
20. However, a preliminary injunction barring Mobil's acquisition of Marathon has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 3.
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ments of a claim and to argue the legal merits of claims. Lawyers know
the elements of a claim of breach of contract or of negligence. In dealing
with such claims they know what facts they have to find and what the
range of effective argument may be. However, when asked to determine
whether there was a conspiracy in restraint of trade or a monopoly or the
abuse of a monopoly, competent lawyers can become confused. The facts
do not readily trigger reactions based on fundamental values of right,
wrong, fairness and reasonableness. The effort to determine and regulate
the desired structure of the markets of a large, complex economy through
a judicial mechanism is one of the most questionable elements of the U.S.
antitrust philosophy. Should the courts be deciding how to restructure
the oil industry?"1 Should lawyers be deciding whether AT&T should be
one company or twenty-two?2 The judicial process appears to be a highly
inappropriate mechanism for structuring an economy, but Americans
would feel over-governed if the FTC or another administrative agency
were authorized to declare that it would be beneficial to have twenty-two
telephone companies where there had been one. In spite of the incon-
gruity of determining the structure of one of our most essential service
industries by the decisions of the parties in a settlement conference, that
method does placate the American apprehensions about centralized plan-
ning, and this is an apprehension that is not likely to fade in today's po-
litical climate.
The papers presented at this symposium emphasize the fact that the
EEC antitrust system is more directly regulatory. Even though the sub-
stantive rules of EEC antitrust law were extensively adapted from Ameri-
can antitrust principles, their system of investigation and enforcement is
much more administrative in character. 2 Although judicial procedures
are employed at higher levels in the EEC, the EEC system regards the
regulation of monopolistic activity as an administrative process.24 As a
result, the EEC employs procedures which, although lacking in the due
process elements dear to the hearts of American lawyers, address more
openly the political, social, and public policy content of the inquiry in-
volved in reaching conclusions with respect to antitrust matters brought
before the commissions.'5
VI. THIRD WORLD
The symposium was a conference of American and European practi-
tioners. One of the factual elements they recognized was the proliferation
of international trade and the extent to which the commercial world (in
21. The FTC recently dropped a case against Exxon and seven other oil companies.
The purpose of the case was to restructure the oil industry. [July-Dec.] ANTrrmuar AND
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1031, at A-28 (Sept. 17, 1981).
22. EmTRPusE LAW, supra note 4, at 225.
23. Id. at 39, 63.
24. Id. at 39-40.
25. Id. at 43.
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parallel to the political world) has become pluralistic rather than being
dominated by a few imperial trading giants.2" The implication of this con-
dition seems to be, however, that the reconciliation of U.S. and European
antitrust laws is not such a dominant concern for the 1980's as one might
expect. The views on competition and monopoly of all countries of the
world will become significant to the establishment and preservation of
healthy trading and investment conditions in world commerce. As the
greater interdependence of the nations of the world becomes clearer, the
next symposium of this kind could well be planned as an effort to present
a global perspective.
VII. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The subjects of industrial organization and corporate governance re-
ceive relatively minor treatment in these papers, but there are some inter-
esting insights. American enterprises have been criticized for the failure
to give the public interest a sufficient voice in corporate decisions which
affect the public at large."7 There are also those who believe that, with
respect to internal corporate governance, there should be a federal incor-
porating statute.28 Such a statute is desired in order to prevent interstate
competition to become the popular situs for incorporations, as this popu-
larity usually results because states have adopted statutes lax toward cor-
porate management."9 State statutes designed to induce corporations to
incorporate in that state are alleged to favor interests of control groups to
the detriment of the interests of minorities, employees and other groups.
While Americans are still trying to decide how much fiduciary and
social responsibility can be required of corporations, a different corporate
governance philosophy is emerging in Europe. The evolving European
view of corporate governance is that any business is a joint enterprise of
capital and labor.80 The responsibility of the board of directors is not only
to maximize the benefits accruing to the suppliers of capital but also to
maximize the benefits accruing to labor. The law in West Germany re-
quires labor representation on the board of directors.31 There is also labor
representation in France, although its voting power is less than in Ger-
many." Consider by contrast the controversy that surrounded the place-
ment of one labor representative president on the board of Chrysler Cor-
poration." U.S. corporate law has not yet endorsed the concept that the
board of directors has a responsibility to give the interests of labor repre-
sentation comparable to the interests of capital, but it may be that, in the
26. See id. at 86-94.
27. Id. at 125.
28. Id. at 126-27.
29. Id. at 123-24.
30. Id. at 112-16, 137.
31. Id. at 119.
32. Id. at 110.
33. Rowe, supra note 1, at x.
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pragmatic American style, a reconciliation will emerge through recogni-
tion that constructive solutions to problems between labor and manage-
ment may well be lubricated by the non-compulsory inclusion of labor
representation on the board of directors.
VIII. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE
The theme of extraterritoriality recurs regularly in these papers. The
European nations continue to resent and challenge the efforts of Ameri-
can enforcement officials and plaintiffs to reach conduct which European
authorities regard as being beyond the reach of the American law.14
American antitrust enforcement officials have asserted for decades that
they are not attempting to reach extraterritorial conduct in any unusual
fashion." The controlling U.S. principle has been the effects doctrine.3 6
This doctrine asserts that if someone is standing in a foreign country and
fires a bullet across the U.S. border which injures a U.S. citizen, the
United States should be able to assert jurisdiction over the perpetrator of
this assault, if it ever finds him or his property within U.S. borders, be-
cause he has caused a harmful effect in the United States which U.S. law
was designed to punish. In its simplified form this argument seems hard
to rebut, but problems arise from efforts at discovery and enforcement. A
conceptual attack on the effects doctrine, of which some European au-
thorities are fond, was expressed in the unfortunate opinion of Justice
Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.3 7 The good justice
stated there that "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country whefe the act is done. ' '8
Perhaps the shortcoming of this statement can be overcome by arguing
that an act is "done" in the place where its effects are felt. This is too glib
for analytical purposes, and it is necessary to explicitly disagree with this
statement of Justice Holmes in order to permit the application of U.S.
antitrust law in situations in which persons outside the borders of the
United States engage in anticompetitive conduct which has a significant
impact upon the internal markets of the United States. It should not be
possible for foreign trading concerns to acquire economic advantage in
U.S. domestic or foreign commerce through the use 'of pricing and compe-
tition methods which would be unlawful if under taken within the United
States.
A reconciling doctrine may have been found in the case of
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,19 in which the court has
added to the mechanical effects doctrine the idea that, even if technical
jurisdiction can be found through application of the effects doctrine, the
34. ENTERPRISE LAW, supra note 4, at 220-21.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 221.
37. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
38. Id. at 356.
39. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
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decision to assert juris diction should depend upon "international comity
and fairness."' 0 Professor Hawk does point out, however, that ironically
the European Commission appears to be adopting the effects doctrine at
the same time the United States may be developing a doctrine of balanc-
ing foreign interests and concerns with U.S. interests and concerns in a
fashion which is less mechanical than what may be evolving as EEC
doctrine.'
1
An interesting facet of the comparison between U.S. and European
antitrust laws is developed by Frances G. Jacobs. His interesting paper'2
compares the two systems in the context of many issues of direct concern
to practicing lawyers: the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts;
the extent to which the European Court of Justice may review decisions
of the Commission on questions of fact; the extent to which the principles
of the European governing statutes may be enforced in the national
courts, particularly in private actions by plaintiffs seeking to use the leg-
islation as a sword rather than as a shield to found a cause of action in
the national courts. Particularly on this latter point, the difference be-
tween the European and American conditions is substantial because in
the United States, but not in Europe, the prophylactic effect of a private
right of action has been relied upon heavily for the development of the
law and the enforcement of the principles of the antitrust laws. Ninety-
five percent of the antitrust cases filed in U.S. courts in 1978 are said to
have been private actions.'3 By contrast, and perhaps as an inheritance
from the civil law tradition and its reliance upon administrative mecha-
nisms, the existence of a private right of action for this purpose in Euro-
pean courts is only beginning to be explored." Whether the European
courts will wish to begin hearing such cases will depend in part on how
horrified they may be at the impact of the "big case" upon caseloads and
judicial procedures in the U.S. courts.
IX. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The existence of state participation in the ownership of enterprises
will create problems in connection with antitrust enforcement because of
the existence of the sovereign immunity, sovereign compulsion, and the
act of state doctrines. "' Whether foreign governments will be able to de-
fend the anticompetitive activities of their commercial instrumentalities
by asserting that the actions of these instrumentalities are acts of state"4
which may not be challenged in the courts, is an area with vast implica-
40. Id. at 613.
41. Ewrnpimsz LAw, supra note 4, at 44.
42. Id. at 204-15.
43. Id. at 185.
44. Id. at 213, 232-33.
45. See Comment, note 14 supra.
46. The act of state doctrine is accepted by U.S. courts and, according to the doctrine, a
U.S. court must refrain from examining the validity of the acts of a foreign state. Id. at 86.
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tions for the development of the antitrust law of the 1980's.
X. BERNARD BARUCH
The breadth and depth of the issues involved here make it difficult to
imagine that only the courts will participate in the development of the
major principles of antitrust law. There is a continuing debate in all na-
tions about the extent to which business and government should cooper-
ate or merge. Even in the thinking of major American business leaders
there has never been unanimity on this subject, although the prevailing
stereotype of the American businessman is that he wants as little govern-
ment as possible. The Reagan Administration has squarely lined itself up
with this approach. Nevertheless, the idea that the public good must be a
factor in corporate decisions has been with us for a long time.'7 In spite of
his dominant position as a Wall Street figure, Bernard Baruch is said to
have "preferred voluntary cooperation between business and govern-
ment."'" Viewing free competition as chaos, but resisting government
ownership of industries, he favored cartel-like arrangements to stabilize
prices and production.'"
XI. ESSENCE OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST LAW
The pithiest description of the national antitrust laws of western Eu-
rope was reported by Mr. Rosenthal, based on a recollection by Lloyd
Cutler: "Under German antitrust law, everything is prohibited unless ex-
pressly permitted; under British antitrust law, everything is permitted
unless expressly prohibited; and under French antitrust law, everything is
prohibited but there is always a way around it."50
XII. WARNING TO U.S. COUNSEL
One of the significant lessons of this volume for U.S. lawyers is that
antitrust law is not an exclusively U.S. product. As U.S. manufacturers
compete more effectively in European markets, and as exports increase,
more and more lawyers in all parts of the United States will be called
upon to advise regional clients with respect to foreign operations. The
existence of a form of antitrust regulation in Europe will require serious
consideration in addition to the consideration which U.S. lawyers nor-
mally give to the operation of U.S. antitrust principles upon their plans
for sales representation and product distribution. The objective of Euro-
pean Community law is not so much to maximize competition as it is to
minimize restraints upon trade between participating countries in the Eu-
ropean Community.5" This difference is reflected in the detailed consider-
47. ENTERPRIsz LAW, supra note 4, at 134.
48. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1981, Book Review Section 22.
49. Id.
50. ERPRiemsE LAW, supra note 4, at 245.
51. Id. at 45.
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ation given to territorial restrictions in establishing systems of distribu-
torships, in comparison with the absence of any controls over mergers and
acquisitions."
XIII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the essential character of these papers is that of a snapshot
of sophisticated thinking about antitrust law in Europe and the United
States at a given moment in time. They do not represent a comprehensive
study nor a reference work for explicit counseling research. They do not
present the black letter law or the detailed requirements of any of the
statutes bearing on the subject. They assume the reader has most of that
knowledge and move on to survey the significant developments and impli-
cations for the 1980's. Because of the quality of the participants and the
openness with which they were able to approach these subjects, the pa-
pers are a stimulating and useful collection of readings for Atlantic com-
munity practitioners who are going to deal with the antitrust and corpo-
rate governance problems of the 1980's.
52. Id. at 45-46.
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The Law of Transnational Business
Transactions
Reviewed by Peter M. Sussman*
NANDA, V. P. (ed.), THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS; Clark
Boardman Co., Ltd., New York, N.Y. (1981); $75.00 (practitioner's edition),
$15.00 (student edition); ISBN 0-87632-342-5, LC 81-2392; xxii, 13 chapters,
each separately paginated; footnotes, index, appendices. Introduction by Don-
ald W. Hoagland.
The Law of Transnational Business Transactions deals with sub-
jects that traditionally have not been of concern to most practicing Amer-
ican lawyers. There have long been international law specialists in major
commercial centers such as New York, Chicago and San Francisco. To
most American attorneys in private practice, international law was, and
perhaps remains, an esoteric field. As Donald W. Hoagland makes clear in
his excellent introductory chapter, the interdependence of the nations of
the world is a fact of modern life. Consequently, more and more U.S.
attorneys, in all parts of the country, will be called upon to represent
clients in matters that raise international issues. These clients may be
American businessmen engaged in international trade or investment or
they may be foreigners involved in ventures in the United States. Such
representation will require a degree of understanding of international law
and of the international environment that has hitherto been demanded of
only a few specialists in the American legal profession.
Professor Nanda's volume on international commercial transactions
is well-timed. It meets the growing need for a better understanding of the
law and customs that govern international commercial transactions. The
timing is all the more fortunate because the existing legal literature in
this field is largely inadequate. While there are some good textbooks, such
as Steiner and Vagts' Transnational Legal Problems,' they are generally
out of date. The exception is A. Lowenfeld's six-part series on interna-
tional economic law,' three volumes of which were updated last year. The
*Peter M. Sussman is a partner at Erickson, Holmes, Nicholls, Kusic & Sussman in
Denver, Colorado. B.A., Queens College, New York; M.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Uni-
versity of Denver.
1. H.J. STEINER & D.F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLuMS (2d ed. 1979).
2. A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. I, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE
TRADE (2d ed. 1981); A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. II, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT (2d ed. 1981); A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. III, TRADE
CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS (2d ed. 1981); A.F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW, PT. IV, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1977); D.R. TILLINGHAST, INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. V, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS (1978); A.F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, PT. VI, PUBLIC REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE (1978).
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Lowenfeld books, however, are definitely designed as teaching tools, and
they are not suitable for, nor are they intended to be, handbooks for the
practicing lawyer.
Professor Nanda's book is advertised as a handbook for the practic-
ing attorney, but it is also available in a student edition. Thus, it seems
intended to serve two purposes. Whether one book can serve the needs of
both practicing lawyers and law students is debatable. A law student
must learn basic concepts to analyze problems and formulate the legally
relevant questions to which those problems give rise. The student must
also have some idea of how to find the answers to those questions, but he
is not required to know specific answers to detailed questions. Further-
more, such knowledge would not be particularly useful to the student
since the law is likely to change before he enters practice and is called
upon to advise clients. The practicing attorney, on the other hand, is
looking for specific, reliable, and up-to-date information when he consults
a legal handbook.
Several of the chapters in Professor Nanda's book provide the type of
information practicing attorneys need. Thus, there is an excellent chapter
entitled "United States Taxation of Foreign Investors" by H.K. Lidstone
and R.S. Rich, which provides essential guidance for the practitioner who
is called upon to represent a foreign investor. This chapter was partially
obsolete by the time the volume was published, however, since it dis-
cusses U.S. law only up to July 1980. Since that time Congress has passed
the Foreign Investment in Real Property Act' which imposes new report-
ing requirements and potential tax obligations on the foreign investor. It
is, of course, to be expected that there will be constant and rapid change
in the volatile field of international commerce. To the extent that The
Law of Transnational Business Transactions is a handbook, it will there-
fore need frequent updating. The publisher has indicated that periodic
updates will be issued for the looseleaf edition. No such service is availa-
ble for the more reasonably priced student edition.
Other chapters that appear to be geared to satisfy the needs of the
practicing attorney are: "Foreign Business Organization" by R.B. Lake;
"Selected Clauses in Transnational Contracts" by M.S. Caldwell; "Inter-
national Technology Transfers" by R.Y. Peters; "International Technol-
ogy Transfer Agreements" by M. Bard and R.Y. Peters; "Foreign Natural
Resource Investment" by J.E. Horigan; "Forum-Selection and Choice-of-
Law Agreements in International Contracts" by Ved P. Nanda; "Anti-
trust Aspects of International Business Operations-U.S. and EEC Sub-
stantive Law" by T.L. Banks; and "International Boycotts" by S.J. Doyle.
On the other hand, many of the chapters such as "Jurisdictional
Problems in the Application of the Antitrust Laws" by D.K. Pansius,
"Enforcement of the European Community's Antitrust Laws-The Single
Enterprise Theory" by L. Heimke Filegar and L.L. Helling, and "Foreign
3. I.R.C. §§ 897, 6039C (1981 Supp.).
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Trade and Economic Injury-A Survey of U.S. Relief Mechanisms" by
P.S. Dempsey seem better suited for classroom use. The division of the
chapters into two distinct categories is necessarily somewhat arbitrary.
Some of the chapters fit into both categories, but most of them do not.
Although space does not permit a detailed review of each of the thir-
teen chapters, a few remarks are in order. R.B. Lake's chapter on foreign
business organizations is quite useful. It provides a brief overview of cor-
porate organizations abroad. Also, it deals with the important subject of
international distributorships and provides a good basic form for a dis-
tributorship agreement. On the other hand, this chapter suffers more
than most from sloppy editing and proofreading, particularly with regard
to Table A' which lists the names used in certain foreign countries for
stock corporations and limited liability companies. There are printing er-
rors in the entries for Belgium and Luxembourg, and the Italian names
for the two types of organizations are reversed.
M.S. Caldwell's chapter on selected contract clauses provides a very
good basic guide for lawyers who are not specialists in international com-
mercial law. It touches briefly on arbitration, a subject that should have
been dealt with at greater length at some point in the volume. A number
of useful sample contract clauses are provided. This author would suggest
that Caldwell's apparent belief that a force majeure clause may be in-
voked because inflation drives up prices is probably not well-founded. In-
flation cannot be regarded as wholly unforeseeable,' and provisions for
price increases can be inserted into commercial contracts.
The chapters on international technology transfer by R.Y. Peters and
M. Bard offer solid basic information required by a practicing lawyer
whose familiarity with the field is limited. These two chapters and the
extensive documentation that is appended to the second of the chapters
constitute an excellent starting point for an attorney desiring to arrange
an international technology transfer.
J.E. Horigan's chapter on foreign natural resource investment deals
with a politically sensitive subject. His point of view is that shared by
most people in the United States but by very few in the Third World or
perhaps even Canada. When control over natural resources is at stake,
the concept of sanctity of contract as it was thought to apply to foreign
investors has lost its force. To the American lawyer that may indeed seem
like a reversion to the "law of the jungle," but realistically American law-
yers will have to adjust to this irreversible development. To show what
today's investor is up against, it might have been useful if Horigan had
cited some of the more recent UN resolutions dealing with this subject or
4. THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BusNmsS TRASACTIONS 2-48 (V.P. Nanda ed. 1981).
5. A force majeure clause used in a contract can generally be invoked only to protect
the promisor from contingencies beyond his control such as acts of God and government
actions. Id. at 4-16.
6. Foremost among these resolutions is G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) 29 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(no. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). For a discussion of the Charter of Economic Rights
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if he had referred to Canada's new National Energy Program. 7
Professor Nanda's chapter on forum-selection and choice-of-law
agreements is an excellent guide to an extremely important aspect of in-
ternational commercial law. It is hoped that this chapter will eventually
be expanded to cover other procedural aspects of transnational litigation.
In his chapter on antitrust, T.L. Banks undertakes the difficult task of
describing U.S. and EEC antitrust laws and their international effects.
The chapter provides solid information and analysis.
As indicated above, D.K. Pansius' chapter on jurisdictional problems
in the application of antitrust laws is broad enough in scope and suffi-
ciently well written to serve as a teaching text. The chapter provides in-
teresting insight into the practical limitations of conventional legal con-
cepts when such concepts are applied to litigation which transcends
national boundaries. Pansius suggests, for instance, that it is not clear if
U.S. antitrust law applies to cartels such as OPEC. He contends that such
cartels might well be amenable to antitrust action under the commercial
activity exception to the act of state doctrine. The argument is legally
interesting, but it is of no practical consequence since no U.S. antitrust
judgment against OPEC would be enforceable given the political and eco-
nomic realities of today's world. Futhermore, the current legal skirmishes
between the U.S. courts which are attempting to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction s and the British Government which maintains that such at-
tempts infringe on British sovereignty, which culminated in the passage
of the Protection of Trading Interests Act by Parliament in March of
1980,' demonstrate that there are limits to the extent that our courts can
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust proceedings. In the long
run, the controversy that has arisen can be resolved only by government-
to-government negotiations.
The chapter on the European single enterprise theory by L. Heimke
Filegar and L.L. Helling sheds an interesting light on the legal devices
used by the Commission of the European Communities to assert extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction in antitrust cases. This chapter should be of particu-
lar importance to U.S. attorneys who represent multinational corpora-
and Duties of States, see Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
7. THE NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM 1980, Dep't of Energy, Mines and Resources (Ot-
tawa, 1980). See generally W. DOBSON, CANADA'S ENERGY POLICY DEBATE (available from
C.D. Howe Institute, Montreal, 1981) (discusses the Canadian debate over the new federal
energy policy).
8. Extraterritorial discovery has been particularly problematic because discovery is cru-
cial in U.S. antitrust cases, and foreign nations resent the efforts of U.S. courts to exercise
jurisdiction in their countries. As a result, they have enacted laivs precluding discovery by
U.S. plaintiffs. Id. at 10-51.
9. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, reprinted in 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF
ENGLAND 11531A (4th ed. 1981 Cum. Supp.). For a general background discussion of Ameri-
can, British and European Community antitrust case law, see Extraterritorial Application of
Trade Laws, reprinted in 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 1531 (4th ed. 1977).
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tions with European subsidiaries.
Professor Dempsey's survey of U.S. relief mechanisms against eco-
nomic injury caused by foreign trade deals with a topic that will inevita-
bly grow in importance as the world economic situation deteriorates.
There is at the moment a retreat from the free trade principles enshrined
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) 10, and at least
a flirtation with protectionism. This tendency will be aggravated, in this
country and elsewhere, if the recession deepens. Professor Dempsey ar-
gues that U.S. industry is placed at a disadvantage because it is heavily
burdened by government regulation while our government's free trade
policies expose domestic industry to the full force of international compe-
tition. Hence, U.S. industry will have to avail itself of the relief mecha-
nisms outlined in Professor Dempsey's chapter. It is questionable that
U.S. industry is as shackled as Professor Dempsey suggests. Many of the
competitors of our domestic industry operate in countries where the laws
regarding environmental protection, health and safety, wages and hours,
and employee benefits are far more stringent than they are in this coun-
try. This would suggest that our industrial decline may be due to internal
factors such as inadequate investment in new plants and equipment, wage
demands that have outpaced increases in productivity, and management
that is overly concerned with short-term profits. If such is the case, resort
to protective devices to shield U.S. industry against the effects of its
shortcomings would not be a cure for our economic ills. It would, in fact,
aggravate them.
S.J. Doyle's chapter on international boycotts is merely a description
of the Arab boycott of Israel and of the resultant U.S. antiboycott laws.
While it is a useful resume of the boycott and the relevant laws, this
chapter, like others in the book, evidences less than careful proofread-
ing.1" The many spelling errors" in this book may be regarded as a non-
substantive fault, but the errors are so numerous that they seriously de-
tract from the content and undermine the book's claim to be regarded as
an important contribution to legal literature. An effort should be made to
correct these errors in the next edition of this work.
In summary, Professor Nanda's The Law of Transnational Business
Transactions constitutes a not totally successful first step in the right
direction. Such a book is needed. What is lacking, however, is a focus. It
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat., Pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
11. Thus, footnote 1 on page 132 reads: "Arab League, General Principals for the Boy-
cott of Israel (1972) [hereinafter cited as General Principals]." Also, the footnotes on pages
9-18 through 9-53 do not correspond to the numbers in the text.
12. Merely by way of example, chapter 12 contains references to "principle legal reme-
dies", "wrecking havoc", and "deternine." Foreign words fare less well. For instance, in
chapter 2, there are three spelling errors in Table B which deals with French business orga-
nizations. In addition, the accent marks that are essential in French are omitted entirely. In
chapter 9, there are frequent references to the Commission des Communautks europkennes,
usually in case citations, and it is misspelled every time.
1982
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
is unlikely that the book can serve both the practitioner and the student
well. If it is to be a practitioner's handbook, frequent updates must be
assured."3 In addition, the scope of the book might have to be enlarged.
Overall, the title of this volume promises more than it delivers.
13. An update and expansion of the book, Release #1, appeared in August 1982. The
Release includes an expanded chapter 9, new material in chapter 10, a revised index, and an
entirely new chapter by Harold S. Bloomenthal on International Capital Markets and Se-
curities Regulation.
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